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The starting point for this volume is that domination consists in subjection 
to the will of another or others; it manifests itself both as a personal rela-
tion and as a structural phenomenon serving as the context for relations of 
power. A person who is dominated is vulnerable in a profound way: she 
is constrained in her choices, unable to freely form life plans, and denied 
equal, autonomous standing with others in a political community or shared 
social structures. The paradigmatic example of the dominated person is the 
slave. Even if she does not actually suffer any ill-because the master is 
benevolent-she is subjected to the master's whim. More recently, scholars 
have lamented the status of the undocumented immigrant, who is vulnerable 
to deportation, the struggles of indigenous peoples who are ruled by the set-
tler states that colonized them, and the predicament of the global poor who 
live (or die) at the discretion of others. 
These are not just examples of misery, deprivation, poor health, or rela-
tive inequality. These people are subject to the whims of others, even if they 
are not actually interfered with. They often lack the status, the voice, or the 
standing to challenge the laws, institutions, and dominating structures to 
which they are subject. The question of whether or not they receive a fair 
distribution of goods and resources is primarily a topic for global distribu-
tive justice. However, the focus of this volume is on domination and global 
political justice. Global political justice examines the creation and reform of 
institutions and the fairness of background contexts in which decisions are 
made. 1 As several of our contributors emphasize, the question of distribu-
tion is not the only, or even the first, question of justice: justice is focused on 
the prior question of power, which asks how decisions are made and who 
has the standing to make them, rather than simply whether these decisions 
are correct. On this view, injustice is human produced, and refers first, or 
1 See Terry Macdonald and Miriam Ronzoni, "Introduction: The Idea of Global 
Political Justice," Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 
15, no. 5 (2012): 521-33, 521. 
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also, to relations of domination between human beings and not just to dis-
tributional inequity. 2 
Of course, distributive justice and domination are often connected in 
practice. In order for agents to be sufficiently empowered to withstand dom-
ination, or to demand to exercise the power that they are formally granted, 
they may require certain resources, such as health care or shelter. Ensur-
ing that such agents are granted access to those resources might then serve 
distributive justice as well as help safeguard their freedom. However, while 
distributive concerns often follow from concerns of domination, the two can 
pull in different directions. A just global distribution may result through the 
benevolent intentions of a dominating agent, for instance, just as the slave 
may receive goods and resources from a benevolent slave master. And, as 
some of our contributors emphasize, a lack caused by nature might not be 
a concern of justice at all, or less so than deprivation caused by relations of 
domination.3 Domination across borders remains a problem so long as there 
is global political injustice. 
This volume addresses domination across borders in its conceptual, 
historical, and institutional aspects. Such domination can take various 
forms. The victims may be individuals or collectivities such as peoples or 
states, and the dominating agents may be other states, global institutions, 
non-state actors such as global corporations and international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), or structural elements of the global 
order. Finally, domination across borders may affect different domains of 
life-economic, social, or cultural-and its scope may be global, interna-
tional, or transnational.4 
Global justice can have a few meanings with reference to justice and 
non-domination across borders. Global justice can be used as a generic 
term referring to justice at the global level, leaving open what relations 
of domination should be focused on to formulate the best theory of non-
domination across borders. Global justice can also refer to the idea that 
there are principles or duties of justice with a global scope, or a single global 
context of justice, at least given today's interdependent world. It can be 
used to refer to specifically "cosmopolitan" theories of justice, which focus 
on achieving non-domination for all individuals. In contrast, international 
2 For this view, see section 1 of Rainer Forst, "Transnational Justice and Non-
Domination: A Discourse-Theoretical Approach" (this volume); Forst, "Two 
Pictures of Justice," in Justice, Democracy and the Right to Justification: Rainer 
Forst in Dialogue (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014); Duncan lvison, "Indig-
enous Peoples, Injustice, and Global Politics" (this volume). For a criticism of this 
view, see Stefan Gosepath, "Deprivation and Institutionally Based Duties to Aid" 
(this volume), 262-71. 
3 Forst, lvison, and Gosepath explicitly discuss this distinction in this volume. 
4 Cf. Michael Mann, "Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-
State?" Review o{International Political Economy 4, no. 3 (1997): 472-96. 
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justice focuses on non-domination between states (or nations or peoples), 
without directly focusing on the domination of individuals. Transnational 
justice focuses on multiple forms of domination.5 Relations of domina-
tion include non-state actors. Transnational actors such as multinational 
corporations are less affected by state boundaries in their operation and 
membership, and "pass right through" those boundaries. Domination need 
not result from any single (individual or collective) agent, as victims can 
suffer from structural forms of oppression across borders, resulting from 
the possibly unintentional and overlapping effects of a number of different 
agents. 6 
Domination of course also occurs within states. A person may be at 
the mercy of an unelected government, she may suffer from the effects of 
corporate malfeasance and be unable to obtain redress, or she may be sub-
ject to the influence of unaccountable cultural and religious organizations. 
Indeed, many of the political movements of the day crystallize around issues 
of perceived, actual, or potential domination. Popular outrage about an 
unaccountable police force, a wealthy and rapacious elite ("the 1%") and a 
lack of control over immigration, healthcare, or climate change policy can 
be explained as expressions of concern with domination, both within and 
across borders. However, the purpose of this volume is to extend the focus 
of these debates about domination to the global level. 
In the current world order, with its multitude of disparate supra-state 
organizations, private organizations, and states, domination across borders 
is a matter of serious concern. A person may be dominated when her coun-
try of citizenship is invaded by another state. She may be dominated by a 
global corporation that uses the disproportionate resources that it has at 
its disposal to disobey domestic labor laws. A global institution or non-
governmental organization may dominate a community by imposing a 
culturally inappropriate program of assistance and evading accountability 
to the recipients. Domination across borders may entail the destitution of 
individuals through ill-conceived aid programs that favor the interests of 
global capital over those of the affected populations. It may be located in 
the structural conditions that increase global economic inequality or accel-
erate climate change, leading to impoverishment or displacement. More 
diffuse forms of structural injustice may lead to the global subordination of 
women.7 Domination may also involve racial injustice through a structure 
5 Rainer Forst, "Towards a Critical Theory of Transnational Justice," Metaphiloso-
phy 32, nos. 1/2 (2001): 160-79. 
6 Amy Allen discusses this in "Domination in Global Politics" (this volume). Cf. Iris 
Marion Young, Responsibility for Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); 
Nancy Fraser, Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 
7 Allen, "Domination in Global Politics"; Young, Responsibility for Justice; Fraser, 
Scales of Justice. 
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of global white supremacy, operating not necessarily through a centralized, 
organized agent, but through transnational relations.8 
Our contributors write from the perspectives of, and discuss insights 
from, critical theory, liberalism, republicanism, power theory, feminism, 
critical race theory, postcolonial thought, global governance, and interna-
tional law. We take as our point of departure the concept of non-domination 
as it appears in neo-Roman republicanism and ask how this might be criti-
cized and how different conceptions of domination could be developed and 
theorized. What is domination and how does it relate to injustice? What 
can different conceptions of domination and non-domination explain and, 
conversely, what do they fail to explain? 
A subsequent set of questions pertains to the role of history and con-
text in domination and theorizing about domination across borders. To 
what extent does non-domination correct existing power relations and 
to what extent does it take them for granted? To what extent should theo-
rizing about justice begin from the history of domination across borders 
rather than abstract from it? 
Finally, there are questions of global institutional design, which ask how 
global domination can or should be countered. What role, if any, should 
non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play? 
Should our focus be on founding new institutions rather than reforming 
existing ones? And is an institutional solution even possible, or must we 
draw on additional, cultural and other, resources? 
The chapters in our volume address these three sets of questions-
conceptual, historical, and institutional-in three different sections. 
1 DOMINATION AND NON-DOMINATION: 
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
Since the revival of the republican tradition of thought, which began with 
J.G.A. Pocock in 1975,9 domination has once again become a central 
concern within political theory. 10 The Roman or neo-Roman republican tra-
8 Charles W. Mills, "Race and Global Justice" (this volume), 189. 
9 J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the 
Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). 
10 Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defense of the Con-
stitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007); 
Samantha Besson and Jose Luis Marti, eds. Legal Republicanism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009); John Braithwaite and Philip Pettit, Not Just Deserts: A 
Republican Theory of Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); 
John Braithwaite, Hilary Charlesworth, and Aderito Soares, Networked Governance 
of Freedom and Tyranny: Peace in East Timor (Canberra: ANU Press, 2012); Wil-
liam Brugger, Republican Theory in Political Thought: Virtuous or Virtual (New 
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clition that this volume draws on, and reacts to, is not to be confused with 
the Republican political party in the United States. Nor is it to be confused 
with the Greek republican tradition that is inspired by Aristotle and empha-
sizes the importance of civic virtue and political participation as an essential 
component of the good life. 11 
In the contemporary literature on neo-Roman republicanism, the work 
of Philip Pettit has been especially influential. Pettit argues that freedom is 
best contrasted with domination rather than with interference. A person 
is free from interference when no obstacles are placed in her way, and no 
option is forcibly removed from consideration. 12 Freedom from domination 
York: Macmillan, 1999); Lena Halldenius, Liberty Revisited (Lund, Sweden: Bok-
box Publications, 2001 ); Iseult Honohan, Civic Republicanism (London: Routledge, 
2002); Iseult Honohan and Jeremy Jennings, eds., Republicanism in Theory and 
Practice (London: Routledge, 2006); Cecile Laborde and John Maynor, eds., Repub-
licanism and Political Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007); Cecile Laborde, Critical 
Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008); Frank Lovett, A General Theory of Domination & Jus-
tice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Eric MacGilvray, The Invention of 
Market Freedom (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Jose Luis 
Marti and Philip Pettit, A Political Philosophy in Public Life: Civic Republicanism 
in Zapatero's Spain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); John Maynor, 
Republicanism in the Modern World (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2003); Andreas 
Niederberger and Philipp Schink, eds., Republican Democracy: Liberty, Law and 
Politics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013); Adrian Oldfield, Citi-
zenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World (London: 
Routledge, 1990); Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Gov-
ernment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), Paperback ed., with postscript 
[1997]; Pettit, On the People's Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democ-
racy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Pettit, Just Freedom: A 
Moral Compass for a Complex World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2014); Henry 
Richardson, Democratic Autonomy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); 
Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998); Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner, eds., Republicanism: A 
Shared European Heritage, 2 vols. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2002); Maurizio Viroli, For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nation-
alism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Viroli, Republicanism (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 2002); Daniel Weinstock and Christian Nadeau, eds., Republicanism: 
History, Theory and Practice (London: Frank Cass, 2004 ); Stuart White, Build-
ing a Citizen Society: The Emerging Politics of Republican Democracy, ed. Daniel 
Leighton (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2008). David Miller, who is sympathetic 
towards republicanism, has published on citizenship and national identity. See, for 
example, David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
11 Cf. Eric Nelson, The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). In his chapter in this volume, John Maynor 
writes that this strand is often associated with so-called communitarian authors such 
as Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor. See Maynor, "Should Republican Liberty As 
Non-Domination Be Outsourced?" (this volume), 228-30. 
12 Pettit, Republicanism, ch. 2. 
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is both more and less demanding. Not all interference is considered norma-
tively objectionable: in a republic or democracy, laws restrict choice, but 
those laws are not imposed on the citizenry without their exercising con-
trol over that process. Interference thus need not be dominating. However, 
conversely, there can be domination in the absence of interference. An early 
definition of this focused on freedom as 'antipower'; that is, the capacity 
to emancipate from power. Pettit has since moved away from this term, 
emphasizing instead that the hallmark of a free person is "not being subject 
to the arbitrary power of another." 13 A person lacks freedom when another 
agent interferes arbitrarily in her decision-making, or when that agent has 
the capacity to interfere in this way. Pettit, in the lead chapter of part I of this 
volume, says that a person is dominated when under the (active, virtual, or 
reserve) control of another: domination objectionably "puts you under the 
will of another." 14 It is intentional and occurs between agents, rather than 
as a structural feature of the political or economic order. 
In recent years, Pettit has explicated the conceptual links between free-
dom as non-domination, on the one hand, and democracy, on the other. 15 
For Pettit, non-domination is the primary political ideal; it can subsume 
other concerns within it, and in the case of conflict, it has primacy over other 
considerations and values. 16 
Other republicans, such as James Bohman, offer a more explicitly dem-
ocratic interpretation of freedom as non-domination, defining it as the 
normative power of a person to "influence the terms of cooperation with 
others and not be ruled by them." 17 Cecile Laborde also argues in favor of a 
critical republicanism, and she draws on Karl Marx, Michel Foucault, and 
others to highlight structures, as well as agents, of domination. 18 
Until recently, the scope of neo-Roman republican political thought 
remained limited to domestic politics. However, as multiple contributors 
to this volume also emphasize, globalization has problematized the role 
of states and rendered an exclusive theoretical focus on domestic politics 
13 Pettit, "Freedom as Antipower," Ethics 106, no. 3 (1996): 576-604, 576. Note 
that James Bohman and especially Terry Macdonald, in this volume, prefer the term 
"antipower" to later formulations. See Bohman, "Domination, Global Harms, and 
the Priority of Injustice: Expanding Transnational Republicanism" (this volume); 
Macdonald, "Ami power, Agency, and the Republican Case for Global Institutional 
Pluralism" (this volume). 
14 See Pettit, "The Republican Law of Peoples: A Restatement" (this volume), 44. 
15 Pettit, On the People's Terms. 
16 See, for example, Pettit, "The Domination Complaint," in Nomos XLVI: Politi-
cal Exclusion and Domination, eds. Melissa S. Williams and Stephen Macedo (New 
York: New York University, 2005), 118-63. 
17 James Bohman, Democracy Across Borders: From Demos to Demoi (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2007), 27. 
18 Cecile Laborde, "Republicanism and Global Justice: A Sketch," European Journal 
of Political Theory 9, no. 1 (2010), 48-69. 
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implausible. Political and economic decision-making frequently escapes 
state control, and new agents such as international NGOs and transnational 
institutions assist states with tasks of global governance. 19 In addition, global 
agents such as multinational corporations threaten to escape state control. 
This raises doubts about the validity of the idea of the bounded political 
community, which is presumed in much neo-republican thought. States may 
no longer be fully effective public agents, and it may instead be necessary to 
look beyond the state in order to counter domination effectively. 
That republicanism did not theorize domination across borders until 
recently is perhaps not a surprise. International political theory emerged in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, when Charles Beitz and Henry Shue each 
published monographs about political theory beyond borders,20 and schol-
ars started identifying these and other works as examples of approaches to 
global justice.21 Early work focused on questions regarding our responsi-
bilities to help the global poor and reduce global inequality, as well as the 
ways in which we could meet these obligations.22 Distributive concerns 
have understandably-given the amount of misery and inequality that exists 
worldwide-been a focus of much of the literature on global justice.23 
However, that the republican tradition has an aptitude for international 
theorizing has been evident since Nicholas Onuf's historical study on the 
republican provenance of ideas such as sovereignty, international society, 
and the democratic peace.24 In the first chapter in part I of this volume, "The 
19 Global governance can be defined as "systems of rule ... in which the pursuit 
of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions" (J. N. 
Rosenau, "Governance in the Twenty-First Century," Global Governance 1, no. 1 
(1995): 13-43, 13). For an example of a critical-theoretical construal of the features 
of domination displayed by one crucial, global governance institution, the World 
Trade Organization, see Jonathan Trejo-Mathys, "Toward a Critical Theory of 
the WTO: Thinking with Rawls Beyond Rawls," Constellations 20, no. 3 (2013): 
459-82. 
2° Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1979). Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US 
Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). 
21 A piece by Peter Singer preceded both books. However, Singer's concern was 
international ethics, not international justice. Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and 
Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, no. 1 (1972): 229-43. 
22 See Brian Barry, Theories of Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1989), esp. ch. 5; Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1989), part 3; Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Malden, 
MA: Polity, 2002). 
23 For a collection of important pieces on global justice (with a distributive focus), 
see Thomas Pogge and Darrel Moellendorf, eds. Global Justice: Seminal Essays (St. 
Paul, MN: Paragon House, 2008). We simplify here, leaving out discussions of just 
war theory, immigration, secession, and other topics. 
24 Nicholas G. Onuf, The Republican Legacy in International Thought (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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Republican Law of Peoples: A Restatement," Pettit extends his influential 
formulation of the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination to the 
international level. 25 
Like Rawls, whose title he also draws on,26 Pettit's intervention in 
global political thought comes after a number of scholars have already 
articulated global republican approaches based on the values and institu-
tions of his domestic modelY Also like Rawls, Pettit is skeptical about the 
possibility and desirability of a truly globalized version of his domestic 
theory, which would substitute global for domestic public institutions as 
the guarantors of individual freedom. Instead, because he expects that 
states will continue to exist in more or less their current configuration, he 
proposes to start with "states as they are" and "the international order as it 
might be." 28 
In Pettit's view, states are organized along two dimensions: their effec-
tiveness and their domestic character. Only effective, popularly controlled 
states serve the interests of their citizens, and therefore only the domina-
tion of these states is a normative concern. As Pettit sees it, a republican 
international order has no reason to promote the interests of states that are 
functionally ineffective or unrepresentative, and such states are therefore 
excluded from the international regime in question. (This regime loosely 
resembles Rawls's "Society of Peoples," even though Pettit does not use 
that term.29 ) The initial question is how those well-ordered states or peoples 
ought to relate to one another and what collective projects they ought to 
pursue. A subsequent question, which Pettit does not address here, is how 
these states ought to relate to the individuals who reside in excluded states. 
Pettit argues that the global order should be arranged so that peoples can 
organize both internal and external relations according to the ideal of non-
domination, thus achieving "a non-dominated status in relation to other 
states and other international agencies. "30 
25 His chapter, "The Republican Law of Peoples: A Restatement," is a substantial 
revision of Philip Pettit, "A Republican Law of Peoples," European Journal of Politi-
cal Theory 9, no. 1 (2010): 70-94. He has also addressed non-domination across 
borders in Pettit, just Freedom, ch. 6: "States and Sovereignty." 
26 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1999). 
27 See especially Steven Slaughter, "The Neo-Roman Republican Legacy and 
International Political Theory," ANU Working Paper 2003/5, 2005, https://digitalc-
ollections.anu.edu.au/bitstream/18 85/4 268 8/2/03-5 .pdf; Slaughter, Liberty Beyond 
Neo-Liberalism: A Republican Critique of Liberal Governance in a Globalizing Age 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). However, unlike Rawls and his cosmo-
politan critics, such as Thomas Pogge and Charles Beitz, Pettit and Slaughter largely 
agree on what a global extension of the theory should look like. 
28 Pettit, "The Republican Law of Peoples: A Restatement," 37. 
29 Rawls, Law of Peoples, 3. 
30 Pettit, "The Republican Law of Peoples: A Restatement," 38. 
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How can non-domination be achieved in such a regime? Pettit argues that 
global institutions might be able to promote common global reasons and 
foster deliberation and reason-giving. However, such institutions may not 
be sufficiently powerful to successfully counter domination. An alternative, 
complementary mechanism is the promotion of 'coalitions of the weak,' 
whereby weaker states present a united front in the face of a dominating 
power, be that another state or a corporation. As he sees it, the advantage of 
his proposal is that it recognizes the problem of domination, even where no 
interference is present, but that "it is not an unrealistic ideal that we have 
little or no reason to expect states ever to implement." 31 
James Bohman's chapter further advances the line of argument he 
developed in a series of articles-including, notably, "Republican Cosmo-
politanism"-and his book, Democracy Across Borders: From Demos to 
Demoi.32 In those writings, Bohman extended the republican conception 
of non-domination to the global sphere and interpreted non-domination as 
a normative conception, concerned with statuses and standing rather than 
merely bilateral, arbitrary interference or the capacity for such interference. 
Here, he argues that republicanism must prioritize injustice rather than jus-
tice, and injustice generally rather than only the injustice of domination. 
This follows Amartya Sen's book The Idea of ]ustice,33 which Bohman 
argues is congenial to republicanism, since republicanism focuses on mini-
mizing domination rather than achieving perfect justice. Focusing on Pettit's 
notion of "antipower," which Pettit set aside in favor of (the capacity for) 
arbitrary interference, he interprets it as "the power over those who would 
dominate us, and thus the control over one's life via the content of one's obli-
gations and statuses. "34 Anti power is the joint exercise of Jiirgen Habermas's 
communicative freedom and communicative power, the former of which is 
"the exercise of a communicative status, the status of being recognized as a 
member of a public" while the latter is the incorporation of communicative 
freedom into "institutionalized processes of decision-making. "35 Freedom 
as non-domination establishes the kind of equality that allows a person to 
make claims on others. 
31 Ibid., 64. 
32 See, for example, James Bohman, "Republican Cosmopolitanism," The Jour-
nal of Political Philosophy, 12, no. 3 (2004): 336-52; Bohman, "Is Democracy a 
Means to Global Justice? Human Rights and the Democratic Minimum," Ethics and 
International Affairs 19, no. 1 (2005): 101-16; Bohman, "From Demos to Demoi: 
Democracy Across Borders," Ratio Juris 18, no. 3 (2005): 293-314; Bohman, 
Democracy Across Borders; Bohman, "Non-Domination and Transnational Democ-
racy," in Republicanism and Political Theory, ed. Cecile Laborde and John Maynor 
(London: Blackwell, 2008), 190-216. 
33 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2009). 
34 James Bohman, "Domination, Global Harms, and the Priority of Injustice," 74. 
35 Ibid., 75. 
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Bohman argues for the inclusion of various forms of domination, such as 
epistemic domination, which denies a person's standing as a knower. In addi-
tion, in order to combat domination, it is not sufficient to allow for tracking 
of interests or mechanisms of contestation. Instead, Bohman proposes to use 
the all-subjected and all-affected principles to shed light on the myriad ways 
in which a person may be dominated. The all-subjected principle suggests a 
broad scope for domination, since individuals may be subjected to multiple 
state and non-state actors. Migrants and refugees are certainly subjected 
to domination by state authorities, since they lack the status of being a 
citizen. The all-affected principle can capture instances of domination that 
occur at a distance, and it takes account of degrees of vulnerability, which 
is often correlated with poverty. Bohman's example here is vulnerability to 
climate change. This broadening of the scope of non-domination-beyond 
the nation-state, but also beyond political domination or interest tracking 
and contestation-ensures that republicanism can reach its potential as "a 
critical theory for post-national exclusions and hierarchies."36 
Rainer Forst's previous works and his chapter here touch on a number 
of themes that are important for this volume's focus on domination and 
global political justiceY For Forst, the first question of justice is the ques-
tion of power: justice is focused on who determines what goods are received 
by whom, rather than on the outcome of what is received. The paradig-
matic victim of injustice is not someone who suffers miserably due simply to 
nature. We may have reasons of moral solidarity to aid them. It is another 
matter if a person's deprivation occurs through relations of domination. For 
Forst, justice and injustice are relational. The demand for justice is a demand 
to overcome forms of domination. Forst opposes justice to arbitrariness, and 
thereby defines domination: "Arbitrary rule is the rule of some people over 
others without legitimate reason-what I call domination." 38 
Forst points to two aspects of domination. The first involves "being 
subjected to a normative order that cannot properly be justified to you. "39 
Justification refers not merely to hypothetical justification, but involves 
participation in actual institutions. Justice refers to the quality of relations 
36 Ibid., 85 
37 Forst, "Transnational Justice and Non-Domination"; Forst, Justification and Cri-
tique: Towards a Critical Theory of Politics, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press, 2013); Forst, The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist 
Theory of Justice, trans. Jeffrey Flynn (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); 
Forst, "Transnational Justice and Democracy: Overcoming Three Dogmas of Politi-
cal Theory," in Political Equality in Transnational Democracy, eds. Eva Erman and 
Sofia Nasstrom (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 41-59; Forst, "A Kantian 
Republican Conception of Justice as Nondomination," in Republican Democracy, 
eds. Andreas Niederberger and Philipp Schink (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2013), 154-68. 
38 Forst, "Transnational Justice and Non-Domination," 90. 
39 Ibid., 96 
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between persons who justify claims to each other within a basic institutional 
structure that binds them. The second aspect of domination involves "being 
subjected to a normative order where no proper institutions and possibilities 
of justification are in place to begin with. "4° Forst's view is relational but it 
is not institutional. If there is not a basic structure in which the practice of 
justification occurs, justice demands that it be set up. He does not limit jus-
tice to the state, as there are multiple forms of domination transnationally. 
Forst critically engages with Pettit's neo-republican view in two ways. 
First, he offers an alternative Kantian republican view of non-domination, 
and favors an interpretation of Pettit's view that brings him closer to this 
Kantian view. Forst says that Pettit has, at least in the past, offered a view 
that Forst refers to as "negative republicanism," which says that through 
the rule of law and other republican mechanisms, actors enjoy a realm of 
freedom of choice that is protected against arbitrary interference. Forst, 
however, says that one is not truly free if one simply receives freedom of 
choice in this narrow sense. This is not true freedom. In Kant's terms, citi-
zens must also be authors of the laws to which they are subject. Kant says 
that every human being has a right of freedom: "Freedom (independence 
from being constrained by another's choice), insofar as it can coexist with 
the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only 
original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity. "41 In Forst's 
terms, this means that every person has a basic right to justification. Each 
person is an independent justificatory authority. Forst says: "Justice as jus-
tification determines which freedoms are justified and what an arbitrary 
interference is in the first place. "42 Justice is prior to enjoying freedom of 
choice in the narrow sense. 
Second, Forst sees a tension between two types of realism present in 
Pettit's view of international justice. The first type of realism limits global 
justice to the politically "realistic" assumption that the state system will sur-
vive, and attempts to reform and achieve non-domination between states on 
40 Ibid. 
41 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical Philosophy, ed. and 
trans. Mary ]. Gregor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
353-603, 393, 6: 237. In different ways, other works interpret and/or are inspired 
by Kant's innate right of freedom (often referring to it as freedom-as-independence). 
See Anna Stilz, Liberal Loyalty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), esp. 
37f; Katrin Flikschuh, Kant and Modern Political Philosophy (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), esp. 88f; Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: 
Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2009). See also the contributions in "Symposium on Ripstein's Force and Free-
dom," European Journal of Philosophy 20, no. 3 (2012). For a survey of views 
on freedom-as-independence and criticism of Kant or some Kantian views, see 
Christian List and Laura Valentini, "Freedom as Independence: A Critical Survey," 
Working Paper, 2012/2013, http://personal.lse.ac.uk/list/PDF-files/Freedom-as-
Independence. pdf. 
42 Forst, "Transnational Justice and Non-Domination," 97. 
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that basis. The second type of realism tracks non-domination in all its forms, 
even if it is not between states, and pays attention to what we realistically 
know about how domination works in all its forms. Taking into account 
realism, in the second sense, Forst questions whether we can expect reforms 
limited by realism, in the first sense, to solve non-domination globally. 
Pettit's reliance on coalitions of the weak and other reforms may be achiev-
able, but it may not be enough, given what we realistically know about how 
power works in transnational institutions. Forst suggests that parties could 
be accorded standing in justificatory processes in a more thoroughgoing 
reform of transnational institutions. 
Amy Allen does not here concede that domination is the only way to think 
about power; far from it. Indeed, in other work on feminist perspectives on 
power, Allen has used the term "domination feminist theorists" to include 
those who speak about illegitimate and unjust "power-over" relations (even 
if they use terms like "subjection," "patriarchy," "oppression," or "sub-
ordination").43 In contrast, "empowerment feminists" see power primarily 
as transformative. They define it as an ability or capacity.44 Theorists who 
invoke the latter seem to go beyond a conception of domination, even as 
broadly defined by Allen in one work.45 Allen herself has argued elsewhere 
that we need to move beyond a one-sided emphasis on either domination 
or empowerment.46 
In the chapter in this volume, however, Allen's project is to critically inter-
rogate Pettit's neo-republican internationalist account of non-domination. 
Allen accepts, for the purposes of this chapter, the idea of non-domination 
as the normative goal of a theory of transnational or global justice. Allen 
follows Bohman in arguing that Pettit's view of domination as arbitrary 
interference is overly narrow in its focus on dyadic relations; that is, relations 
between two or more agents. Drawing on the literature of power theory, she 
suggests that we should distinguish between four dimensions (or faces) of 
domination: arbitrary interference, institutional agenda-setting, structuring 
of interests, and constitution of subject-positions. She argues that Pettit's 
agent-centered account cannot account for all of these dimensions. 
Looking at gender relations in particular, she argues that Pettit's account 
of non-domination as a master/subject relation is inadequate even within 
states today. Here, she cites Nancy Fraser's concern about the shift to "more 
impersonal structural mechanisms that are lived through more fluid cultural 
43 See Amy Allen, "Feminist Perspectives on Power," The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2014 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/sum20 14/ entries/feminist-power. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Allen, "Rethinking Power," Hypatia 13, no. 1 (1998): 21-40. See also Allen, The 
Power of Feminist Theory: Domination, Resistance, Solidarity (Boulder, CO: West-
view Press, 1999). 
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forms. "47 She also refers to Iris Marion Young's idea of structural injustice, 
which can arise from unconscious assumptions of well-intentioned people, 
cultural stereotypes, market mechanisms, and other processes of ordinary 
Jife.48 Allen argues that the way Pettit apparently focuses on agents and 
intentions fails to pay attention to how the overlapping effects of {possibly) 
unintentional actions by agents may lead to structural oppression. Allen 
then argues that her alternative account better theorizes the global subordi-
nation of women and the complex, multiple, and intersecting structures of 
domination across borders. 
2 HISTORY, IMPERIALISM, AND RACE 
The second section of our volume turns to historical injustice, empire, and 
imperialism-all topics that are of significant interest in political theory 
roday.49 Republicanism has a problematic history with imperialism, often 
47 Nancy Fraser, "Beyond the Master/Subject Model: Reflections on Carole Pate-
man's Sexual Contract," Social Text 37 (1993): 173-81, 180 
48 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990), 41; Young, Responsibility for Justice. 
49 Political theory has not always paid attention to empire and imperialism. For 
a review of the political theory literature, see Jennifer Pitts, "Political Theory of 
Empire and Imperialism," Annual Review of Political Science 13 (2010): 211-35. 
More recently, see Sankar Muthu, ed., Empire and Modern Political Thought (Cam-
bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Jeanne Morefield, Empires without 
Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). For various perspectives 
on colonialism and its legacies, see Jacob T. Levy with Iris Marion Young, eds., 
Colonialism and its Legacies (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011); see also the 
references to postcolonial thought in Thomas McCarthy, "Liberal Imperialism and 
the Dilemma of Development" (this volume). For summaries of various approaches 
to and writings on historical injustice, see Cecile Fabre, "Reparative Justice," injus-
tice in a Changing World (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2007); Lukas Meyer, ed., Justice 
in Time: Responding to Historical Injustice (Baden-Baden, DE: Nomos Verlagsge-
sellshaft, 2004 ); Jon Miller and Rahul Kumar, eds., Reparations: Interdisciplinary 
Inquiries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). Among the many writings on 
transnational historical injustice, see Daniel Butt, Rectifying International Injustice: 
Principles of Compensation and Restitution Between Nations (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2009). On indigenous peoples, colonialism, and transnational racial 
injustice, see, for example, Duncan lvison, Postcolonial Liberalism (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for 
Justice, esp. ch. 7; Catherine Lu, "Colonialism As Structural Injustice: Historical 
Responsibility and Contemporary Redress," Journal of Political Philosophy 19, no. 
3 (September 2011); Rhoda E. Howard-Hassman with Anthony P. Lombardo, Repa-
rations to Africa (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Timothy 
Waligore, "Cosmopolitan Right, Indigenous Peoples, the Risks of Cultural Interac-
tion," Public Reason: Journal of Political and Moral Philosophy 1, no. 1 (2009): 
27-56; Duncan lvison, Paul Patton, and Will Sanders, eds., Political Theory and the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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combining a concern with domination at home and enthusiasm for domina-
tion abroad. At the same time, republicans have worried that empire abroad 
will corrupt republican liberty at home. Pettit explicitly brackets the question 
of historical justice, saying he will "set aside the question of what certain, 
powerful states may owe to other states as a matter of historical justice."50 
He appears to believe that this is a question that can be answered after we 
have determined which principles ought to govern the international order. 
A different approach to political theorizing makes the history of domination 
across borders more central, focusing from the beginning on specific histo-
ries of domination, including imperialism, the use of ideas of modernization 
and development, settler colonialism, and racial injustice. 
All four authors in section II situate struggles for non-domination in a 
specific historical and political context involving imperialism and domina-
tion across borders. John McCormick's piece is historical and interpretative, 
and touches on the relationship between freedom at home and domina-
tion across borders. Thomas McCarthy, Charles Mills, and Duncan lvison 
engage in contemporary theorizing, arguing that historical injustice cannot 
be bracketed in theorizing about justice. All four authors explore how the 
strategic or political endorsement of imperialism or associated ideas and 
practices can be used in political struggles to advance equality. This might 
be done by advocating imperialism as a rhetorical strategy to achieve non-
domination at home (McCormick, interpreting Machiavelli), using "race" 
to engage in non-ideal theorizing, where the starting point is a world shaped 
by global white supremacy (Mills), using "development" as part of a critical 
theory given the inescapable conditions of global modernity (McCarthy), 
or viewing justice as dependent on actual historical practices of domination 
(lvison). 
Ever since the Roman Republic transformed into the Roman Empire, 
it has been in doubt whether republics can adequately practice and theo-
rize non-domination abroad. The Italian city-states were often oppressors 
abroad, pursuing the glory of empire, while proclaiming the importance of 
republican ideals at home. The Italian city-state of Florence fits this example 
particularly well, and the Florentine Niccolo Machiavelli is usually thought 
to share this split outlook. In his book, Machiavellian Democracy, and his 
chapter here, John McCormick challenges this interpretation of Machia-
velli.51 McCormick says that Machiavelli was not an unqualified champion 
of empire, and did not think that glory should come at the expense of liberty 
when the two collided. Rather, Machiavelli made his argument to a specific 
audience with a specific purpose in mind. Machiavelli's apparent endorse-
ment of empire was a rhetorical strategy to convince aristocratically biased 
50 Pettit, "The Republican Law of Peoples: A Restatement," 41. 
51 John McCormick, Machiavellian Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2001); John McCormick, "The (ln)Compatibility of Liberty and Empire in 
Machiavelli's Political Thought" (this volume). 
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publicans to accept a form of constitutionalism they might otherwise be ~~stile towards, one that would have empowered citizens and protected 
them from domination. He supported measures promoting socioeconomic 
equality that would have curbed imperial expansion. McCormick tells us 
that Machiavelli disapproved of how imperial acquisition corrupted repub-
lican virtue and prioritized freedom over imperial expansion. 
All four authors discuss imperialism with respect to the relationship 
between concerns of socioeconomic and political equality and concerns 
of status, race, identity, or glory. In Nancy Fraser's terms, this could be 
seen roughly as the concerns of "redistribution" and "recognition. "52 
McCormick's Machiavelli emphasizes the former, privileging the reduc-
tion of inequality over glory when the two clash. McCarthy does not allow 
recognition to trump concerns of socioeconomic and political equality. 
He holds that for most, it is intrinsically desirable to have basic protec-
tions, to not live in misery, and to have a voice in their own affairs. He 
allows that modern ideas and institutions may threaten certain aspects of 
non-modern worldviews, but accepts this tension as inescapable. Charles 
Mills says that even if a principle of cosmopolitan distributive justice were 
applied at a global level, this would not adequately address racial injus-
tice, if this were not seen as a payment of a debt. Relations, not merely 
distributive outcomes, are important. Past wrongs must be recognized as 
wrongs and treated differently. The correction of racial wrongs generally 
must involve the (re)affirmation not simply of personhood, but of racial 
personhood for the living and the dead. lvison says that justice should not 
simply be concerned with claims regarding resources, but with what sta-
tus we have in relation to others. Focusing simply on the "disadvantage" 
ignores the importance of the humiliation, failed policies, and embedded 
racism involved in the history of colonialism. 
McCormick's Machiavelli is concerned with the effects of imperialism at 
home; his rhetorical argument for imperialism is aimed at non-domination at 
home, and does not seem concerned with the fate of those dominated abroad 
for their own sake. McCarthy, Mills, and lvison each advocate for a form 
of universalism or cosmopolitanism that nonetheless demands the political 
use of concepts, ideas, practices that were created and shaped through the 
history of domination across borders. However, they see the relationship 
between history and theorizing about justice in different ways. 
McCarthy's chapter begins by examining how ideas of development and 
progress have been invoked to justify domination across borders, from the 
settlement of the Americas to contemporary neo-imperialism.53 While liber-
alism purports to be universal, classical liberals have both justified European 
52 Fraser, Scales of Justice. 
53 McCarthy's chapter here is reprint of chapter 6 of his Race, Empire, and the Idea 
of Human Development (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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domination and have been involved in the practice of it. European domina-
tion involves a cognitive dissonance for liberals, which is reduced through 
developmental theories. Certain types of norms and institutions are held to 
be universal, but European (and later US) domination over "backwards" 
non-Europeans is said to be necessary for them to progress and develop to 
the point where these norms are appropriate and these institutions achieved. 
This embodies the dilemma of development. 
McCarthy discusses how this dilemma appears in the thought of Imman-
uel Kant and John Stuart Mill, and then discusses how this dilemma, and 
developmental thought more generally, is relevant today. McCarthy does 
not reject developmental theory, but uses insights from postcolonial critics 
of development and Jiirgen Habermas's discourse theory of democracy to 
argue for "a critical theory of global developrnent." 54 
McCarthy draws on Dipesh Chakrabarty's thought that European heri-
tage is now a global heritage: certain modes of thought cannot be avoided. 
However, Europe's ideas of modernity need to be decentered or provin-
cialized, in that they are not adequate for non-Western peoples' political 
experiences of modernity. European thought is to be renewed and rethought 
from the margins, and ideas of modernity pluralized, rather than completely 
rejected.55 McCarthy thinks that John Stuart Mill's type of developmen-
tal thinking is particularly problematic (as is that of Karl Marx); it turns 
development into a natural science, portraying progress as something for 
scientific prediction or technocratic manipulation. Developmental theory 
can be useful when seen as a practical tool in political struggles to further 
health, well-being, capabilities, and political voice. Still, McCarthy says that 
the equal standing of all peoples and individuals is made possible through 
modern concepts and forms like the rule of law and democracy; these may 
threaten certain aspects of non-modern worldviews, so the dilemma of devel-
opment cannot be entirely escaped. McCarthy ends by invoking the Kantian 
hope that some agreement may nonetheless be reached at the global level. 
Like McCarthy, Charles Mills argues for the use of concepts formed by 
domination across borders. Mills asks whether we should use the notion 
of race, even though it would not exist in ideal theory, and it is useless 
as a scientific concept. In other words, should we use this sociohistorical 
product formed through "politics," a construct that arose through domina-
tion? Mills says yes. He invokes McCarthy's discussion of the strategy of 
critical theory: hegemonic ideas are to be examined on the assumption that 
they have been shaped through domination, and should be reconstructed, 
or rejected, with reference to an order without such domination. 56 Race and 
54 McCarthy, "Liberal Imperialism and the Dilemma of Development," 172. 
55 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
56 Mills, "Race and Global Justice," citing McCarthy, Race, Empire, and the Idea of 
Human Development, 14n26. 
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hiteness are invented, but are still real in how they privilege and disadvan-
w ge whites and nonwhites. Invoking these concepts need not justify racial 
:erarchy, but can be_ anti-racist: it can f?rm p~rt of a ~ri_tical race theory 
ritiquing "global white supremacy. "57 Mills claims that It ts a problem that ~ace is largely absent from contemporary literature on global justice. This 
silence contrasts with the writings of older authors, such as Marcus Garvey, 
Martin Delany, David Walker, W.E.B. DuBois, and Sun Yat-sen, who recog-
nized the subordination of the "wronged races" of the world, and spoke of 
white domination of the planet as central to global injustice. 
One of the reasons for this silence about race, Mills says, is the domi-
nant position liberalism has assumed, and especially the lack of attention 
in many prominent liberal theories regarding issues of rectification for 
racial injustice. In a series of works, Mills has criticized how John Rawls, 
the preeminent liberal political philosopher, uses "ideal theory," invoking 
a hypothetical social contract among similarly situated individual parties 
who start from the assumption that society has not experienced a history 
of injustice. 58 This idealization in ideal theory obscures from the beginning 
the need for non-ideal theorizing about compensation for past injustice. 
Mills invokes a "domination contract," a historical contract that estab-
lishes relations of subordination based on race and/or sex. 59 Mills further 
argues that Rawls's theory can be adapted to non-ideal circumstances. He 
uses the history of racism and/or gender as part of the contract apparatus, 
focusing on the need for rectifying racial injustice.60 
In his chapter here, Mills suggests that a racially informed international-
ism is compatible with liberal universalism, but attaches a "not yet" view 
towards a certain type of race-less cosmopolitanism, arguing we need to 
work through race to get beyond it. Mills discusses the need for compen-
sation and to repair the legacy of colonialism's past, including repair that 
pays attention to race. Mills is clear that in non-ideal conditions, we should 
be guided by a "non-ideal (rectificatory) ideal." 61 It may be attractive to 
invoke an ideal where a racialized world does not exist, but it would be a 
mistake to think this applicable in a world with a history of (uncorrected) 
57 This concept is discussed in Charles W. Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1997), 3ff. 
58 See especially Mills, "Rawls on Race/Race in Rawls," The Southern Journal of 
Philosophy XLVII (2009}: 161-84; and his contributions in Pateman and Mills, 
Contract & Domination (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2007). See also Mills, "Racial 
Liberalism," PMLA 123, no. 5 (2008): 1380-97. 
59 This invokes Carole Pateman. See Pateman, Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1988). See also Mills, The Racial Contract; Pateman and Mills, 
Contract & Domination; Desmond King, Carole Pateman, Charles Mills et a!., 
"Symposium: Contract and Domination by Carole Pateman and Charles W. Mills," 
Journal of Political Ideologies 13, no. 3 (2008): 227-62. 
60 In this he differs from Pateman, who rejects social contract theory. 
61 Mills, "Rawls on Race/Race in Rawls," 178-80. 
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racial injustice. 62 Still, Mills can be read to suggest that we should at least 
aspire to overcome these non-ideal conditions through rectification, and 
create conditions where it is once again appropriate to be guided by an 
ideal suitable to a situation where injustice had not occurred (or an ideal 
very close to it). Indeed, Mills thinks the ultimate, long-term goal (if only in 
aspiration) is still, as in Rawls's ideal theory, a world without race. 63 This 
contrasts with McCarthy's view that we cannot entirely escape the ideas 
bequeathed to us by a history of domination, nor should we even strive to 
do so. Even if the history of domination were overcome, would the ideal in 
such a world resemble an ideal from a theory of global distributive justice 
(or an ideal from a theory of global non-domination) that was theorized 
without reference to this history? Do certain ideals become impossible or 
difficult to realize, such that a different ideal of justice should and must 
be striven for? If historical injustice can change the meaning, context, and 
uptake of various ideas, and political theorizing about justice focuses on 
claims publicly justified to others, then domination across borders could 
change what justice publicly amounts to.64 
Ivison tackles the relationship between history and injustice in yet another 
manner. In his chapter, Ivison uses the example of indigenous peoples to 
think about the sources of, and remedies for, domination within and across 
borders, as well as how this can point to a new standard of cosmopolitan 
justice. Like Mills and others, Ivison rejects starting from an ideal theory 
that ignores or marginalizes the history of domination. Indeed, the very 
category of indigenous peoples did not exist before European imperialism 
and settler colonialism. However, in his chapter, Ivison does not envision an 
"end" to indigenous peoples. Ivison adopts a practice-dependent approach 
to justice, which does not assume that there is one eternally true principle 
of justice.65 The content and scope of justice depends at least in part on 
62 Ibid., 180. 
63 Mills makes this claim in "Rawls, Ideal Theory, and Racial Justice," forthcoming. 
Of course, practically speaking, Mills might say it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
overcome non-ideal conditions. 
64 For an argument to this effect with respect to Rawls and the social basis of 
self-respect, and including a discussion of Mills, see Timothy Waligore, "Rawls, 
Self-respect, and Assurance: How Past Injustice Changes what Publicly Counts as 
Justice," forthcoming in Politics, Philosophy & Economics. 
65 On practice-dependent approaches to justice, see Andrea Sangiovanni, "Global 
Justice, Reciprocity, and the State," Philosophy & Public Affairs 35, no. 1 (2007): 
3-39; Sangiovanni, "Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality," Journal of 
Political Philosophy 16, no. 2 (2008): 137-64; Aaron James, "Constructing Justice 
for Existing Practice: Rawls and the Status Quo," Philosophy & Public Affairs 33, 
no. 3 (2005): 281-316; Ayelet Banai, Miriam Ronzoni, and Christian Schemmel, 
"Global and Social Justice: The Possibility of Social Justice Beyond States in a World 
of Overlapping Practices," in Social Justice, Global Dynamics: Theoretical and 
Empirical Perspectives, eds. Ayelet Banai, Miriam Ronzoni, and Christian Schem-
mel (London: Routledge, 2011 ), 46-60. 
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'nterpreting the point of shared practices. Only if people stand in particular ~'practice-mediated relations" to one another do principles of justice hold. 
Ivison invokes a form of practice dependence that also examines how prac-
tices have had historical impact, for good or ill. While this means there may 
be principles of justice that are not global in scope, there are other practices 
that point to universal or cosmopolitan principles. Justice would emerge 
from the interactions between different units, including ones involving 
domination. Like Forst and others, and against Thomas Nagel, he does not 
limit justice to the state.66 Practices of imperialism and domination within 
and across borders have shaped the international system and marginalized 
non-state actors. 
Ivison draws upon Seyla Benhabib, who has used the situation of legal 
and illegal immigrants to point towards "another cosmopolitanism. "67 
Jvison thinks that the situation of indigenous peoples and their appeals to 
international law points to a form of "emergent cosmopolitanism." This 
requires theorizing about the spaces between the local and the global, and 
cosmopolitan or universal justice emerges in a way not possible through 
ideal theorizing. He emphasizes how indigenous peoples have pushed for 
multiple, overlapping forms of citizenship, and for their recognition as 
"peoples" in international law, helping tore-theorize what it means to be a 
"people." This includes disconnecting the idea of self-determination from 
independent statehood. 68 The situation of indigenous peoples has posed 
challenges to traditional notions of sovereignty and even inspired theories 
of "self-determination as non-domination" across borders. 69 
Ivison notes, in a Marxian spirit, that our (mis)conceptions of what con-
stitutes domination may leave important harms in place, and even reify 
them. While invoking Forst, lvison also challenges him, saying that par-
ticular justificatory schemes can themselves be dominating. Injustice, Ivison 
says, is not only tied in with concerns about the standing to make claims, 
but is also concerned with the uptake of claims. A party's claim may be 
66 Thomas Nagel, "The Problem of Global Justice," Philosophy & Public Affairs 33, 
no. 2 (2005): 113-47. 
67 Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004); Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism, ed. Robert Post (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University, 2006). 
68 See, for example, S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Will Kymlicka, "Theorizing Indig-
enous Rights," in Politics in the Vernacular (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), ch. 6. 
69 Iris Marion Young, invoking Pettit, the Iroquois confederacy, and debates over 
the draft declaration of the rights of indigenous peoples, distinguishes between 
self-determination as non-interference and self-determination as non-domination. 
She favors the latter, and argues that it requires federalism, and could be applied 
at various levels worldwide. See especially Young, Global Challenges: War, Self-
Determination, and Responsibility for Justice (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2006). 
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misunderstood or may not (easily) be comprehensible as a claim of justice, 
given the dominant political ideas and forms of justification. The invitation 
to take part in justificatory processes can seem hollow when participants 
struggle to make their claims heard. 70 
Dale Turner has written about how indigenous peoples are constrained 
to speak the language of liberalism if they want their claims understood by 
non-Aboriginal judges and politicians.71 Further, some indigenous writ-
ers argue that indigenous peoples should not aim to be included within 
institutions shaped by historical injustice, and thereby achieve standing to 
make justificatory claims within them, as this may involve buying into cer-
tain dominant discourses, and come at a high cost.72 Indigenous peoples 
have developed their own conceptions of "self-determination." 73 Taiaiake 
Alfred and Jeff Corntassel argue that accepting "self-government" within 
the constitution of the settler state amounts to consenting to transna-
tional historical injustice.74 Corntassel discusses an "illusion of inclusion" 
at the international level; whereas once the United Nations excluded 
70 Amy Allen has also criticized Forst in a somewhat related, but different, manner. 
See the contributions, and Forst's response, in Forst, Justice, Democracy and the 
Right to Justification: Rainer Forst in Dialogue (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 
2014). 
71 Turner, This is Not a Peace Pipe: Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 58-59. Cf. Turner, "Oral Traditions 
and the Politics of (Mis)recognition," in American Indian Thought: Philosophical 
Essays, ed. Anne Waters (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004 ). 
72 Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999). 
73 See, for example, Jeff Corntassel, "Toward Sustainable Self-Determination: 
Rethinking the Contemporary Indigenous-Rights Discourse," Alternatives 33 
(2008), 105-32; Val Napolean, "Aboriginal Self Determination: Individual Self and 
Collective Selves," Atlantis 29, no. 2 (2005): 1-21; Grace Ouellette, The Fourth 
World: An Indigenous Perspective on Feminism and Aboriginal Women's Activism 
(Halifax, NS: Fernwood, 2002). 
74 Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel, "Being Indigenous: Resurgences against Con-
temporary Colonialism," Government and Opposition 40, no. 4 (2005): 597-615. 
Further, it has been argued that indigenous ideas are incommensurable with non-
indigenous ideas, so it is futile to attempt to have them recognized appropriately 
in non-indigenous fora. See Mary Ellen Turpel, "Aboriginal Peoples and the Cana-
dian Charter: Interpretative Monopolies, Cultural Differences," Canadian Human 
Rights Yearbook 6 (1989-1990): 3-45. In contrast, Angelia Means has argued that 
indigenous peoples must risk misrecognition in a multicultural democracy, but that 
their claims may be heard in the form of narrative argumentation; in this way, indig-
enous ideas could inform and transform what ideas mean for everyone, rather than 
indigenous peoples being merely passive recipients of how languages of justification 
are usually used. For example, Aboriginal ideas of land use might alter everyone's 
conception of property. Angelia Means, "Narrative Argumentation: Arguing with 
Natives," Constellations 9, no. 2 (2002): 221-45. However, even if intercultural 
dialogue is possible, it might best be achieved through recognition of indigenous 
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·ndigenous peoples, it now includes professionalized indigenous del-~gates more loyal to the United Nations system than responsive to their 
. . 75 
commumues. 
All four authors in section II of this volume do not simply engage in 
abstract theorizing about justice, but pay attention to the importance of 
political .struggles? .dialogue, and how p_olit~cal claims will be .mad~ and 
received m a specific context where dommauon across borders 1s an Issue. 
McCormick writes about the audience Machiavelli addresses in making 
strategic political arguments about imperialism. McCarthy believes the 
political discourses of modernity-brought about through domination-are 
inescapable, but these norms are required for groups to have equal standing 
in making claims; however, postcolonial critics point out how marginalized 
groups have not agreed, and that we cannot assume that agreement will vali-
date western norms and institutions in a wholesale fashion. Mills invokes 
Fraser's thoughts on contestation about the appropriate way to "frame" 
justice, as it can no longer be assumed that justice takes place in the nation-
state.76 Mills says that concerns about the legacy of colonialism have been 
hidden by what Joe Feagin calls a "white racial frame," which has shaped 
white cognition and theorizing, and ignored the need to repair the past_?? 
Ivison discusses the "uptake" of political arguments, whether indigenous 
peoples can make their claims heard, and how historical practices point to a 
new standard of universal justice. In each of these ways, the authors in this 
section theorize political justice within a historical context of domination 
across borders. 
3 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, INSTITUTIONS, AND 
NORMATIVE THEORY 
In domestic republican theory, non-domination is realized in the con-
text of the state. Recall the definition of freedom as non-domination and 
its contrast with freedom as non-interference. A person who is subject 
to another's arbitrary will is un-free, regardless of whether the domi-
nating person-or institution-actually interferes with their choices. 
Non-arbitrary law, which is formulated by the people in a constitutional 
sovereignty with indigenous peoples having their own separate jurisdictions. See 
Michael Rabinder James, "Tribal Sovereignty and the Intercultural Sphere," Philoso-
phy & Social Criticism 25, no. 5 (1999): 57-86. 
75 Jeff Corntassel, "Towards a New Partnership? Indigenous Political Mobilization 
and Co-optation During the First UN Indigenous Decade (1995-2004)," Human 
Rights Quarterly 29, no. 1 (February 2007): 137-66, 161. 
76 Fraser, Scales of Justice, ch. 2. 
77 Joe R. Feagin, The White Racial Frame: Centuries of Racial Framing and Counter-
Framing (New York: Routledge, 2010). 
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republic, is, by contrast, interfering but non-dominating. Interference is 
problematic only to the extent that it is arbitrary, because in this case the 
interfering agent is "not forced to track the interests and ideas of those 
who suffer the interference." 78 
Individuals are thus only free as citizens of a republic; that is, as members 
of a representative polity whose institutions force it to track their inter-
ests. The protection against domination that state institutions provide is 
not conceptually distinct from these institutions themselves; republican 
freedom is constituted by institutions, and, as Lena Halldenius puts it, 
"institution-dependent." 79 
Given this strong conceptual link between non-domination and state insti-
tutions, the question remains whether the conception of non-domination 
can be adapted to the global context. However, several global republican 
theorists have attempted to do just that. 
Staying close to Pettit's interpretation of republicanism, Steven Slaugh-
ter argues that we must counter domination beyond the state in order to 
safeguard freedom within it. 80 His global civic republican model relies on 
a transformation of the state, rather than the addition of global institu-
tions. James Bohman moves beyond the institutional model of the state. 
Like Slaughter, he argues that the current global order, with its delegation 
of political authority beyond the state, has much potential for domi-
nation. He defines domination by reference to the normative power of 
citizenship rather than the capacity for arbitrary interference or control. 81 
Non-domination is achieved in a democratic system, when "individuals 
are empowered as free and equal citizens to form and change the terms 
of their common life together." 82 Bohman argues that, transnationally, 
the best contexts for the realization of non-domination are multiple, 
overlapping political communities, or demoi. Fabian Schuppert largely 
follows Bohman's global democratic account. He argues in support of 
dispersing power across institutional levels-local, state, regional, and 
supranational-but also links the achievement of global democracy to the 
alleviation of distributive injustice. 83 
78 Pettit, Republicanism, 2 72. 
79 Lena Halldenius, "Building Blocks of a Republican Cosmopolitanism: The Modal-
ity of Being Free," European Journal of Political Theory 9, no. 1 (2010): 12-30, 
12-13. 
80 Steven Slaughter, "The Neo-Roman Republican Legacy and International Political 
Theory"; Slaughter, Liberty Beyond Neo-Liberalism. 
81 Bohman, Democracy Across Borders. 
82 Ibid., 45. 
83 Fabian Schuppert, Freedom, Recognition and Non-Domination: A Republican 
Theory of (Global) justice (Dordrecht, NL: Springer, 2014 ). For another republi-
can approach that is congenial to Bohman's, see Andreas Niederberger, Demokratie 
unter Bedingungen der Weltgesellschaft? (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009). 
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Like Bohman, Lawrence Quill adopts a global republican approach that 
f cuses on citizenship and participatory politics.84 Quill, however, places 
]~tie faith in global institutional solutions-at least in the present context, as 
.
1 dividuals are not yet educated for cosmo-republican citizenship. This form 1~ citizenship, Quill explains, focuses on dissent and resistance. 85 Accord-
?ng to Quill, cosmo-republican freedom is exercised by "communities or 
:ndividuals interested in protest and dissent, exchanging ideas and pro-
posing policy alternatives to those offered by their own territorially based 
"86 governments.. . . . . 
In internatiOnal relatiOns, Dame] Deudney has drawn attentiOn to a tradi-
tion he calls republican security theory, according to which we can be secure 
(or free, in neo-republican parlance) only when both anarchy and hierar-
chy are avoided. 87 Jose Luis Marti's article, "A Global Republic to Prevent 
Global Domination," argues in support of a unified, global institutional 
solution to domination. 88 It stands out as the primary republican contribu-
tion to the recently resurgent literature on the world state,89 which is part of 
normative scholarship on global governance. 
A recent symposium issue, edited by Duncan Bell, brings together some 
of the most interesting work that is being done in this emerging, global 
republican approach. 9° Cecile Laborde has forcefully articulated the prob-
lem of global domination and its link to distributive injustice, calling on 
republicans to tackle the global inequalities that make possible "capability-
denying relations of domination between the rich and powerful and the poor 
and the weak. " 91 
As discussed above, while many international political theorists are inter-
ested primarily in global norms and distributive concerns, including rights 
84 Lawrence Quill, Liberty after Liberalism: Civic Republicanism in a Global Age 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
85 In the absence of education for world citizenship, Quill says that it will be neces-
sary to rely on an elite of politically active, concerned citizens. 
86 Quill, Liberty after Liberalism, 3. 
87 Daniel H. Deudney, Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis 
to the Global Village (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). Anarchy and 
hierarchy can be understood as domination by private and public actors, respectively. 
88 Jose Luis Mart!, "A Global Republic to Prevent Global Domination," Diacritica 
24, no. 2 (2010): 31-72. 
89 See, for example, Luis Cabrera, Political Theory of Global Justice: A Cosmo-
politan Case for the World State (New York: Routledge, 2004); Raffaele Marchetti, 
Global Democracy: For and Against (New York: Routledge, 2008). 
90 Duncan Bell, ed., "Global Justice and Republicanism (Special Issue)," European 
journal of Political Theory 10, no. 1 (201 0), with contributions by Lena Halldenius, 
Duncan lvison, Cecile Laborde, Philip Pettit, and Quentin Skinner. On a similar 
topic, see also Besson and Marti, Legal Republicanism, especially the section on 
republican international law. 
91 Laborde, "Republicanism and Global Justice: A Sketch," 54. 
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to goods and responsibilities to provide those, others address more explicitly 
political questions of global governance. Global governance is best con-
trasted with global government and can be defined as "systems of rule ... 
in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transna-
tional repercussions. "92 Instead of focusing on the substantive content of the 
moral problems that characterize globalization and the current global order, 
global governance projects instead engage with the political question of the 
structure and processes by which the various policies that bear on the moral 
problems associated with globalization gain acceptance. 
Normative global governance scholars tend to focus, first, on the nor-
mative deficiencies and challenges of the current order and, second, on 
the agents, institutions, and processes that may constitute or help facilitate 
reform. The four chapters in section III of this volume also address these two 
important, related questions. 
The first question pertains to the "new circumstances of politics," and 
asks in which respects the current global order falls short. Jiirgen Habermas 
has described the effect of globalization on the constitutionalization of 
international law, which limits the power of states.93 David Held has noted 
five "disjunctures" between globalization and democracy which demon-
strate the way in which globalization has created a new political reality. 
He names the emergence of international law, the internationalization of 
political decision-making, the relationship between hegemonic powers and 
the international security structures, the tension between national identity 
and the globalization of culture, and, finally, the importance of the global 
economy.94 As John Maynor describes in his chapter in this volume, the 
efficacy of the state has been impacted by economic globalization and the 
new global order, which consists not just of states but also non-state actors, 
such as multinational corporations, and supra-state actors, such as global 
institutions. This has serious consequences for individual freedom, since 
states have lost some of their capacity to protect residents against domina-
tion. Similarly, Hauke Brunkhorst laments the non-democratic character of 
global governance, arguing in his chapter that globalization has placed soci-
etal decision-making processes beyond the control of democratic legislation. 
Terry Macdonald in her chapter points more generally to the alienation of 
powerful group agents-such as those that characterize the global order-
from the common goals that motivated individuals to bring them into being. 
As a result, individuals become affected subjects rather than active partici-
pants. Against this concern with the political, Stefan Gosepath in his chapter 
argues that what matters instead is the extent to which the current global 
92 Rosenau, "Governance in the Twenty-First Century," 13. 
93 Jiirgen Habermas, "Does the Constitutionalization of International Law Still Have 
a Chance?" in The Divided West (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2006). 
94 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmo-
politan Governance (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995), 99-135. 
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order fails to alleviate global deprivation; he thinks that a duty to aid is more 
important than a duty to not dominate. 
The second and related question of global governance asks how the world 
order can or should be reformed in line with the values we care about. 
Whereas cosmopolitan democrats such as Held prioritize autonomy and 
self-determination, the primary republican concern is the realization of 
non-domination beyond the state. In either case, pertinent questions include 
which agents ought to perform tasks of global governance and how institu-
tions at various levels of decision-making ought to interact with, and defer 
to, one another. Within this literature, world state theorists, who propose 
a globally unified political authority, fall on one end of the spectrum, and 
political theorists who seek to strengthen the role of the state at the expense 
of other agents fall on the other. In between are global democrats-notably, 
Held and Daniele Archibugi-and those scholars, such as Habermas, who 
advocate for regional or global federalism. 95 
Our volume covers a range of approaches to global governance, both with 
regard to the process of reform and the agents of global governance. The 
agents include states, international NGOs, global corporations, and inter-
national institutions. With regard to these agents, John Maynor argues that 
states are currently best placed to protect individuals against global sources 
of domination, because genuine democracy is only practiced at the state 
level. Appropriately, republican global institutions may emerge over time, 
but at present, states should continue to protect individuals from domina-
tion. Terry Macdonald and Stefan Gosepath disagree with Maynor's focus 
on states, albeit for different reasons. As Macdonald sees it, our world order 
is already a pluralist one, in which public power-a form of group agency 
that aims to advance common goods-is exercised by a complex set of state, 
non-governmental, and intergovernmental (supra-state) agents. Accord-
ingly, republicans ought to focus on creating sources of antipower-a form 
of agency that counters the "choice-constraining effects" 96 of public power 
through participation-at those same levels: state, non-governmental, and 
intergovernmental.97 Stefan Gosepath, for his part, argues that the duty to 
95 See, for example, David Held, Democracy and the Global Order; Held, Global 
Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus 
(Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2004); Daniele Archibugi, The Global Commonwealth 
of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2008); Jiirgen Habermas, The Divided West (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2006); 
Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union: A Response (Cambridge, UK: Pol-
ity, 2012). 
96 Terry Macdonald, "Antipower, Agency, and the Republican Case for Global Insti-
tutional Pluralism." 
97 Macdonald's conception of public power rejects a functional interpretation of 
public power. For an alternative view, see Barbara Buckinx, "Global Actors and 
Public Power," Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 15, 
no. 5 (2012), 535-51. 
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alleviate (global) poverty leads to a requirement that collective agents be 
established. States have been shown to be effective collective agents, so, 
based on past experience, state-like organizations are preferable, though 
other candidates are emerging. Hauke Brunkhorst expresses deep skepticism 
about the role of global institutions in global governance. He argues that 
institutions are part of the problem rather than the solution, and that the 
democratization of world society will be spearheaded not by formal agents, 
but by the politics of global protest. 
In addition to theorizing about the agents, global governance theorists 
also focus on the process of reform itself. The prolific, global democratic 
approach envisions three related transformations in the global order: the 
promotion of coordinated state action, support for effective international 
institutions, and the development of "multilateral rules and procedures 
that lock in all powers, small and major, into a multilateral framework." 98 
Habermas, James Bohman, and others-including John Maynor in this 
volume-look to the European Union as an exemplar of transnational con-
stitutionalism. However, while Maynor admires the European model, he 
ultimately stays close to the institutional prescriptions of domestic republi-
canism. He argues that a world state, or more loosely organized supra-state 
institutions, cannot easily be brought under citizen control, and that it may 
thus be counterproductive to assign such institutions the task of safeguard-
ing non-domination. Instead, citizens should be empowered to utilize state 
institutions to resist domination. The application of republican ideals to 
global institutions may remain an important goal, but the initial and pri-
mary focus should be on the continued development of state institutions in 
accordance with the ideal of non-domination. 
In his chapter, Stefan Gosepath is interested in global institutional 
reform to the extent that it is necessary for the alleviation of severe pov-
erty. Because individuals lack clarity regarding the specific nature of their 
individual responsibility to reduce global deprivation, a collective agent 
must be created or reformed to specify the contours of individual duties 
to aid. Such an agent can be a loose collection of individuals rather than a 
formal institution. A collective agent exists when it is formed on the basis 
of a general consensus, there is a joint definition of shared aims and moral 
norms, action is voluntary, and an internal organizational framework and 
decision-making procedure is in place. Powerful agents have a greater duty 
to create and reform global institutions that will solve for global poverty. 
The duty to form political institutions comes from the individual duty 
to aid, not from a duty to not dominate, as with republicans in this vol-
ume. Gosepath makes eight arguments in opposition to the nee-republican 
emphasis on non-domination, providing a valuable contrast to the posi-
tions of many authors in this volume. For Gosepath, politics is not the 
98 David Held, Global Covenant, 102. 
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first question of justice; deprivation is the first problem, and politics is 
the answer. 
Terry Macdonald, in her chapter, argues that global institutional design 
should be responsive to the constraints that the prevailing material structures 
and cultural artifacts pose on the development of public power and antip-
ower. The existence of these material and cultural preconditions explains 
why democracy-or any other goal of global governance-is only rarely 
successfully imposed through external efforts to build institutions. Instead, 
we must identify existing agencies of political power and then attempt to 
reform them in accordance with democratic norms. 
The volume ends with a chapter by Hauke Brunkhorst, who thinks that 
the greatest source of global domination is legalization and constitutional-
ization, the same processes that are often offered as solutions to domination. 
However, the seeds of reform are contained in the same international legal 
framework that establishes non-democratic transnational rule. The inclusion 
of human rights and "democratic constitutional rhetoric" in international 
legal documents provides the basis for global protest movements that may 
ultimately help transform international law into law that secures space for 
democratic politics.99 
Both republicanism and international political theory have undergone a 
revival in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Seen as a personal relation 
or structural phenomenon that involves subjection to (the will of) another 
or others, domination is a common concern of both literatures. This volume 
brings them together in an effort to advance scholarship on domination 
across borders. 
While domination is best seen as just one form of injustice, there are sys-
tematic and pragmatic reasons to make domination, and the related ideal of 
non-domination, the primary locus of concern when theorizing justice and 
injustice across borders. The republican debate has frequently failed to take 
into account the various, alternative ways of conceptualizing domination as 
a political problem. The contributions here further suggest that what counts 
as domination and injustice can often only be contextually understood with 
reference to the history of domination. Focusing on such problems as impe-
rialism, racism, and the subjection of indigenous peoples suggests that global 
institutional remedies and norms may need to reflect the global history of 
domination across borders. Finally, global domination can be tackled only 
when the contributions of a myriad of global agents-including NGOs, mul-
tinational corporations, and global institutions-to both domination and 
its reduction are acknowledged. Global institutional design itself must also 
be attentive to the problem of global domination and the role that global 
institutions have played, and continue to play. 
99 Hauke Brunkhorst, "Democracy and World Law: On the Problem of Global Con-
stitutionalism" (this volume). 
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